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Abstract 
We explore whether education plays a key role in determining economic liberty. 
Baseline estimates suggest that the educational level of a country, as measured by the 
average years of total schooling, is a significant contributor to economic freedom. To 
isolate exogenous variation, we use historical information on primary school 
enrollment rates and also rely on genetic information. We show that the exogenous 
component of education is strongly correlated with economic liberty after controlling 
for the influence of a number of other relevant factors. We identify access to 
information and media freedom as two channels through which higher education is 
translated into less interventional government policy. We offer non parametric 
evidence and demonstrate that the impact of schooling is non linear. At low levels of 
education its influence is negative implying that economic policies in favor of 
government intervention are more likely to prevail when the educational level of a 
country is low. When moving to higher levels of schooling, this effect switches to 
positive.  
 
Keywords: Economic freedom, Education, Information, Media freedom, Non 
parametric analysis 
JEL classification: D83, I25, Z18 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last three decades a growing number of countries have chosen to liberalize 
their economies in response to increasing global competition. Governments have now 
become less involved in a number of areas such as international trade, taxation and the 
functioning of product, labor and financial markets. While the degree of economic 
freedom has generally increased around the world, the experience of individual 
countries varies greatly with a number of them progressing boldly towards economic 
liberalization and others proceeding with more step wise pace. Overall, there still 
exists considerable variation, with several countries still exhibiting high government 
intervention. 
The existing research has proved that economic freedom plays a significant 
role in the growth process of countries. However it has not yet uncovered the channels 
through which liberalization policies in some regions prevail while in others retreat. 
Limited research has primarily emphasized that fundamental reforms come as a 
consequence of severe economic downturns (Rodrik 1996; Drazen and Easterly 2001; 
Pitlik and Wirth 2003) or that economic policy changes often reflect the decisiveness 
of reform oriented governments that do not bear in mind the associated political costs 
(Cox and McCubbins 2001). Other studies show that economic growth precedes 
economic reforms (Heckelman 2000), that higher levels of democracy affect 
economic freedom (De Haan and Sturm 2003) or that English forms of justice and 
common law structures are associated with higher economic liberalization (La Porta et 
al. 2004). Pitlik (2007) emphasized that there is a strong and positive interdependence 
of economic policy reforms among OECD countries suggesting that geographical 
proximity and learning from others’ success are two important forces behind decisions 
for economic policy reforms.   
3 
 
Paradoxically, education has not yet received noteworthy attention as a driver 
of economic liberty. Parleviet (2017) has proven that education was a systematic 
determinant of public acceptance of Dutch pension reforms during 2003-2013. 
Similarly, Boeri and Tabellini (2012) stressed that Italian individuals who were more 
informed about the costs and functioning of the pension system of their country were 
more willing to accept reforms. Nonetheless, far reaching conclusions on the 
influence of education on economic liberty cannot be offered, as the aforementioned 
studies focus on particular aspects of economic policy in specific countries and time 
periods.  
This paper embarks on this issue by exploring the role of education as a driver 
of economic liberty across a wide range of countries. Our main argument builds upon 
the broad consensus that economic freedom fosters economic growth. We claim that a 
well educated and, arguably, informed citizenry is more likely to encourage political 
choices aimed at improving the long term prosperity of the society as a whole, rather 
than support policies serving the short term interests of special groups. We expect that 
the extent of reforms largely depends on the existence (or not) of educated and 
informed citizens who are those who ultimately decide through their vote. In this 
process the role of the media is of crucial importance as they act as the carrier for the 
transmission of other countries’ economic policy reforms. 
We exploit an unbalanced panel dataset which consists of 125 countries during 
1975-2014 and use regression analysis to look into the influence of education on 
economic liberty. The key difficulty in estimating such a relationship lies on the 
endogenous association between our key variables. To identify a causal effect from 
education to economic liberty we must find exogenous sources of variation in 
education. In doing so so we historical information on primary school enrollment rates 
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and we rely on genetic distance data between countries. We also use nonparametric 
analysis to explore whether the relationship between education and economic freedom 
is non linear. The attractiveness of this methodology lies in its nonparametric nature 
as it does not require any assumption on the statistical distribution of variables. 
OLS regression estimates suggest that the educational level of a country is a 
significant contributor to its level of economic freedom. Our instrumental variable 
estimates confirm this finding, after having controlled for the influence of other 
relevant variables. Given that such an impact hinges on the extent of public 
awareness, we test whether it can be shaped by the diffusion of information. Using 
internet penetration and media freedom as variables to measure the extent of 
information diffusion, we show that the effect of education on economic freedom is 
countable only after a threshold point of information attainment. When emphasizing 
on particular aspects of economic policy, our regressions show that the government 
size, trade freedom and market regulation are the three dimensions of economic 
freedom which are mostly affected by education. Non parametric estimates 
demonstrate that the impact of schooling is non linear. At low levels of education its 
influence is negative indicating that economic policies in favor of government 
intervention are more likely to prevail when the schooling rates are low. When 
moving to higher levels of the educational distribution, this influence becomes 
positive and economically high. The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
discusses the theoretical link between education and economic liberty. Section 3 
introduces the econometric specification and describes the econometric results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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2 Education, information and economic liberty 
We define economic liberty as the ability of the members of a society to undertake 
without hindrance economic actions. Our approach relies on the classical liberal 
tradition which emphasizes free markets, free trade, private property and defines 
economic liberty as the freedom to produce, trade and consume any goods and 
services. This is embodied in the rule of law, property rights and freedom of contract. 
Most high income countries have now pursued the path of liberalization with the 
stated goal of maintaining or increasing their international competitiveness. Emerging 
countries arguably have no choice but to reform their economies as a way to remain 
competitive in attracting domestic and foreign investments. Economic policies in 
favor of liberalization include privatization of public enterprises and assets, greater 
labor market flexibility, lower tax rates for businesses, less restriction on capital 
movement and free product markets. A great number of studies have unequivocally 
proved that economic freedom is associated with higher growth and prosperity of 
countries (some representative but not exhaustive ones include Aghion et al. 2004;  
Aghion et al. 2009;  Alesina et al. 2005; Barseghyan 2008).  
Based on that economic liberty brings about benefits for the society as a 
whole, we document the relationship between education and economic freedom as 
follows: We first state that people’s voting choices are based on their own self 
interest, as predicted by the public choice theory. However people are aware of their 
own self interest only if they are well informed. We thus discuss the role of the media 
and information diffusion in affecting policy and improving political accountability. 
In this field the importance of education is crucial as it favors the diffusion of 
knowledge which in turn affects the formation of a well informed citizenry. In brief, 
we come to that the importance education in overcoming public choice problems 
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related to the adoption of market friendly institutions takes place through its impact on 
citizens’ information. 
Public choice theory, as developed by Buchanan and Tullock in their famous 
The Calculus of Consent (1962), emphasizes rational behavior of individuals and 
assumes that people are guided chiefly by their own self interests and not by public 
interest. Therefore, the motivations of people in the political process are no different 
than those of people in the market. As such, voters will support candidates and 
encourage policies they think will make them personally better off, special interest 
groups will strive for higher government intervention to a greater extent than 
dispersed individuals, while politicians will seek election or reelection to office.  
People however are often unaware on the cost or benefits of a public policy 
because they are not informed on their consequences. As such they might support the 
maintenance of the existing status quo or stick on the side of policies which are at 
odds with their long term interest. Therefore information or lack of information is a 
key factor for preferences and decisions on public policy. A number of recent studies 
have shown that access to information and improved citizens’ knowledge increases 
political participation and improves public policy outcomes. Stromberg (2004b) 
provides evidence that decreasing the cost of acquiring information via the expansion 
of radio increases voter turnout. Besley and Burgess (2002) and Stromberg (2004b) 
illustrate that citizens with better access to information receive more favorable public 
policies. On the other hand, a variety of models predict that policy becomes more 
distorted in favor of narrow interest groups when voters are less informed and that in a 
pluralistic world policy outcomes favor groups with more informed members 
(Grossman and Helpman 2001). Into a narrower context, Winter and Mouritzen 
(2001) considered how the acquisition of information affects voting preferences by 
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reducing fiscal and asymmetrical illusion while Boeri and Tabellini (2012) stressed 
that Italian individuals who were more informed about the costs and functioning of 
the pension system were more willing to accept reforms.  
As regards policy making, Besley and Burgess (2002) argued that a more 
informed electorate strengthens incentives of governments to be responsive. In this 
process the role of the media is crucial to reflect citizens’ preferences in the formation 
of public policy. Politicians in turn have a stronger incentive to be responsive as their 
actions are monitored. A number of follow up studies highlight the positive role of 
either media coverage or media freedom on a number of outcomes related to the 
transmission of information, political participation, accountability of politicians and 
improvement of public policy outcomes (Stromberg 2001; 2004a; 2004b; Brunetti and 
Weder 2003; Leeson 2008; Snyder and Stromberg 2010; Gentzkow et al. 2011; Prat 
and Stromberg 2011; Fergusson 2014).
12
  
Arguably, an educated citizenship is more likely to think actively, make 
informed voting decisions and elect governments which promote its self economic 
interest. In addition, if citizens are educated and informed then decision makers will 
face additional accountability (Przeworski and Stokes 1999) and governments, in turn, 
will have the incentive to engage in public policies in favor of the well being of the 
society as a whole as they wish to be re-elected. Education’s role in preparing 
informed citizenry dates back to the time of Jefferson who quoted that widespread 
political participation is the outcome of a civic oriented education system. Jefferson’s 
                                                                                       
1
 However, the role of the media may be damaging in cases of information misreporting. Negative 
aspects are also related to media capture (Djankov et al. 2003; Besley and Prat 2006) by either 
governments or special interest groups. Such negative aspects are eradicated with the rise of the 
educational level of people.  
2
 Coyne and Leeson (2004; 2009) suggested that the media is an institutional mechanism which plays a 
critical role in the public choice problem of developing market institutions that facilitate economic 
growth. The media can play a crucial role in altering public preferences form government intervention 
to market friendly institutions and modify games of conflict among political agents to coordination 
games. Similarly Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) highlight the role of the press as a key component of 
inclusive institutions that promote economic success. 
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theory of education contends that the role of education is critical in transforming the 
society. He argued that the best way to consolidate democracy in the US was to 
provide people with higher education through which people would be able to make 
more rational and well informed decisions. He also believed that an educated and well 
informed citizenry was the best safeguard against corrupt governments and 
bureaucrats (Wagoner 2004).  
A number of studies highlight the role of education in the process of 
information diffusion as literate people are those who require knowledge, accurate 
reporting and media freedom. Jeffrey (2000) showed that the demand for local 
newspapers in India was influenced by literacy which extended beyond elites and 
reached poorer segments of the Indian population. Educated people were in a better 
position to understand differences among policies and therefore choose those which 
best represent their self interests.3 However education is not only a prerequisite but 
also a means to translate information to correct political decisions. Mondak (1995) 
illustrated that education is a strong predictor of information acquisition as it indicates 
an individual’s ability to assimilate information. 
Coyne and Leeson (2004) stressed that educated people are more likely to 
understand differences in policies and decide to support market friendly policies. 
Milligan et al. (2004) and Dee (2004) showed that increases in education raise 
participation in voting while Glaeser et al. (2004; 2007) evidenced that democratic 
institutions benefit from higher education as it raises political involvement and civic 
participation. Through this process students understand their civic obligations and 
rights which include voting and being informed of public issues. Tabellini (2010) 
                                                                                       
3
 Fowler and Margolis (2014) showed that lack of knowledge on policy positions of major parties in the 
U.S. hinders the ability of low socio-economic status citizens to translate their preferences to vote 
choices. 
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noticed that widespread illiteracy isolates people and reduces their ability to control 
and understand their external environment.  
 
3 Empirical investigation 
3.1 Model specification  
The general empirical model that we use to study the relationship between economic 
liberty and education has the following form: 
ittiititit ueEDUCEFW    11   (1) 
where EFWit is economic freedom of country i at time period t. Our baseline variable 
for economic freedom is a summary index of the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index (Fraser Institute 2017) which measures the degree of government involvement 
in various aspects of economic policy. It summarizes information in five areas which 
are: a) government size, b) legal structure and security of property rights, c) sound 
monetary policy, d) international trade and capital movements and e) regulation in 
business, credit and labor markets, with each of these areas entering in the final index 
with equal weighting. It ranges from zero to 10 with a higher score implying lower 
restrictions and more market friendly legislation.  This index is available in five year 
time points during 1975-2015 for a great number of rich and low income countries.  
As our goal is to study the link between education (EDUCit-1) and market 
freedom, we use information for the average years of total schooling provided by 
Barro and Lee (2013). Observations for education are also in five year points, start 
from 1975 and end in 2010. If education drives up economic freedom, then its 
estimated coefficient β should have a positive sign. Figure 1 plots average economic 
freedom against average years of total schooling for our sample of countries. Their 
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association is strongly positive as the regression line slopes upwardly and the 
associated confidence intervals demonstrate a statistically significant correlation. 
Economic policy reforms are also determined by a number of other economic 
factors. In our vector X we include wealth determinants such as the income per capita 
variable and also GDP per capita growth. We also include the variables of imports and 
exports (denoted as % of GDP) to control for foreign competition and international 
trade effects. All these variables are provided from the Penn World Tables 9.0 
database (Feenstra et al. 2015). We also include in our specification an explanatory 
variable which measures the percentage of population whose age is over 65 (World 
Bank Development Indicators 2016), as older individuals might be more reluctant to 
accept changes and economic reforms. 
Political and institutional factors are likely to affect choices for economic 
policy. Following Pitlik (2007) we include in equation (1) a number of political and 
institutional variables. We first consider that corruption is a factor that adversely 
affects the ability of a government to legislate and implement economic policy 
reforms. Therefore, we enrich our model specification by including a public sector 
corruption index that is provided from the Varieties of Democracy Institute 
(Coppedge et al. 2016). It is a variable whose final outcome depends on the 
respondents’ answers to the question of what extent do public sector employees grant 
favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how 
often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources 
for personal or family use. This index runs from less to more corrupt (scale 0 to 1). 
The degree of political freedom and liberties arguably affects economic 
freedom. Therefore our model encompasses an index which measures the level of 
democracy (Dahlberg et al. 2016) and ranges between 0 and 10. The legal tradition of 
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a country has also been shown to exert an important influence on policy choices (La 
Porta et al. 1999). Hence we consider four dummies which indicate if the legal system 
of the country is British, France, socialist or German oriented (La Porta et al. 2008). 
We finally include in our specification a variable which measures the percentage of 
parliamentary seats of social democratic and other left parties in government to proxy 
for the political orientation of a government (Armingeon et al. 2017). However its 
extent is very limited as it covers only a number of OECD countries. 
 To reduce the impact of the business and political cycle, the economic and 
institutional variables (income per capita, GDP per capita growth, imports, exports, 
people aged over 65, level of democracy, index of corruption and political orientation) 
of equation (1) are 5-year averaged. Our model also encompasses time and country 
specific effects (ηt and ei respectively) in the form of dummy variables to account for 
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity and control for common macroeconomic 
shocks. Main descriptive statistics and cross correlations of the variables of our model 
are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
3.2 Initial estimates 
Table 3 presents OLS econometric results of regressions performed on a sample of 
125 developed and developing countries during 1975-2015. Column 1 of Table 3 
reports coefficient estimates when the identification strategy involves only the 
variable of education. Next we include the determinants of the level of democracy and 
public sector corruption (Columns 2-3). We also introduce in Column 4 the variables 
of income per capita (in logs) and GDP per capita growth. In Column 5, we consider 
the influence of exports and imports (in % of GDP). Column 6 reports results when 
we control for the impact of the variable of the share of population which is over 65. 
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Then we consider the variables of legal origin (Column 7) and political orientation 
(Column 8). 
 The majority of econometric estimates of Table 3 are in favor of a positive and 
statistically significant influence of the variable of education on economic freedom. 
The only exception comes from estimates shown in Column 8 when the estimated 
coefficient of education becomes statistically insignificant. However, the sample of 
observations is limited as the political orientation variable is available for a number of 
OECD countries. Other variables that to exert a substantial influence on economic 
liberalization are the growth rate of GDP, the log of income per capita, imports and 
exports (denoted as shares of GDP), public sector corruption and the level of 
democracy. Also the variable which measures the percentage of parliamentary seats of 
social democratic and left parties exercises a weakly negative effect on economic 
freedom. 
In Column 9 we check if our estimates remain unchanged when controlling for 
persistence in our dependent variable. As institutions evolve slowly, current economic 
freedom is arguably determined by its history. The econometric estimates of Column 
9 confirm that lagged economic freedom affects current economic freedom and 
suggest that we should control for its effects. We verify that the influence of education 
on economic liberalization remains positive and statistically significant though the 
magnitude of its coefficient estimate is lower. As freedom to trade is part of the 
economic freedom index, regression estimates of Column 10 exclude the variables of 
imports and exports as their inclusion could cause a bias in the estimation. The 
econometric results remain practically unchanged and confirm the statistically 
significant influence of education on economic freedom. 
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3.2 Individual dimensions of economic freedom and different education variables 
Estimates of previous section demonstrated that education causes a significant 
impact on economic freedom. However, it would be instructive to uncover which 
areas of economic policy are mostly affected by schooling. Hence, our empirical 
analysis proceeds by exploring which of the five dimensions of economic freedom 
(government size, legal system and protection of property rights, sound monetary 
policy, international trade freedom, market regulation) are influenced by education. 
Regressions are performed in the same way as in Table 3 and are based on the 
specification of Column 9.  
 Column 1 of Table 4 provides us with estimates as regards the influence of 
schooling on government size. This dimension of economic freedom shows the extent 
to which countries rely on personal choice rather than political process to allocate 
their resources. The regression results reveal that education exerts a remarkable 
influence on this dimension of economic policy. Columns 2 and 3 show that education 
does not exercise a strong impact on the proper functioning of the legal system and 
the protection of property rights (Column 2) or on monetary policy stability (Column 
3).  
Regression results of Columns 4-5 show us that education is a key factor in 
determining the dimensions of international trade freedom (Column 4) and market 
regulation (Column 5). Freedom to trade internationally is an area consisting of tariff 
barriers, regulatory trade barriers, black market exchange rates and controls for the 
movement of capital and people. Market regulation focuses on regulatory restraints 
which limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labor, and product markets. We also 
examine if estimates hold when average years of secondary schooling and average 
years of tertiary schooling enter in the regression as educational variables (Table 5). 
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As can be seen by regression results reported in Columns 1-4, both secondary and 
tertiary education variables cause an increase in economic freedom.  
 
3.3 Endogeneity of education  
Coefficient estimates of Tables 3-5 might be subject to endogeneity bias as both 
variables of education and economic freedom are interrelated. Glaeser et al. (2004) 
suggest that the improvement of institutions typically follows a higher level of 
schooling, however reverse causality might be at work, as education is not a fixed 
variable. Well functioning market institutions induce growth which could in turn 
affect education. Also, schooling and liberalization could be jointly determined by 
third common factors rendering drawn inferences invalid. Therefore, omission to 
include other relevant variables and measurement error could create bias in the 
estimated regressions. To establish a causal effect of education on market freedom, 
we need to employ a set of instruments which satisfy the exclusion criterion. If we 
could pinpoint factors which are correlated which schooling but at the same time are 
not associated with economic freedom or its determinants, then these could be used as 
valid instruments to create a causal effect. 
 It has become common in the empirical literature to use historical variables as 
determinants for current economic outcomes (North 1981). We start by defining as 
key instrument for education in our analysis primary school enrollment rates in 1930 
which are provided by Benavot and Riddle (1988). An early date minimizes the risk 
of reverse causation and probably increases variation as educational differences were 
more pronounced in the past.  
Another set of instruments that could create exogenous variation in education 
comes from information on genetic distance of nations. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) 
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created summary measures of genetic relatedness between populations and, as such, 
they capture divergence in the whole set of implicit beliefs, customs, habits and 
attitudes that are transmitted across generations with high persistence. Our 
interpretation is that this measure could conceive differences in people’s perceptions 
and attitudes towards several aspects including schooling and education. Desmet et al. 
(2011) documented a close relationship between genetic distance and cultural 
differences and showed that populations that are genetically closer have common 
beliefs on a set of issues, norms, values, cultural characteristics and perceptions of 
life, family, religion, and morals. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) used this measure to 
show that genetic distance can explain a significant part of contemporary income 
variation across nations while recently Giuliano et al. (2014) showed that genetic 
distance can be used as a measure to proxy for geographical constraints on bilateral 
trade.
4
 
We therefore use as instrument the weighted genetic distance between each 
country and the USA (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009) which is the country with the 
highest level of average years of schooling in our sample. We also mimic 
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) and use information on the Mahalanobis distance 
between the frequency of blood types in a given country and the USA. PISA scores in 
science of students across countries (OECD 2015) constitute another possible 
instrument to proxy for schooling. PISA scores are now one of the world’s main 
                                                                                       
4
 Progress in genetic research now makes possible to predict a number of behavioral outcomes from 
genetic information. Relevant studies have shown that such factors account for at least a modest share 
of differences in educational outcomes in developed countries (Plomin et al. 2008; Branigan et al. 
2013). Rietveld et al. (2013) identified an increasing number of genes associated with years of 
schooling. Cesarini and Visscher (2017) noticed that genes influence cognitive ability through 
heritability, while Belsky et al. (2016) showed that single-nucleotide polymorphisms are positively 
associated with speaking and writing skills in early childhood and subsequent scholastic achievement. 
By this logic, genetic instruments could provide exogenous variation as parents vertically transmit their 
genes to their offspring, with an adverse impact from education to genes being highly unlikely to take 
place. It bears stressing that the heritability per se is not the only relevant factor for predicting 
educational outcomes and does not imply that a person's educational development is already 
predetermined as other factors contribute to its evolution over time.   
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yardsticks in evaluating the quality and effectiveness of educational systems and 
therefore could be employed as additional instruments to establish a causal effect of 
education on economic freedom.   
 Having defined all possible instruments, we proceed to estimate the effect of 
education on economic freedom. Table 6 reports first stage and second stage 
regression results performed by two stage least squares. The effect of schooling on 
economic freedom is always large and statistically significant for all instruments 
selected for education. We also notice from first stage regression estimates that all 
possible instruments exert the expected influence on our variable of education. In 
particular, primary school enrollment rates and PISA scores in science impact 
positively and significantly on education, while variables which measure genetic 
distance from countries with the highest levels of education (USA is the country with 
the highest current level of total years of schooling, while Canada had the largest 
primary school enrollment ratio in 1930) adversely affect current rates of total 
schooling.  
A natural question to ask is whether a variable presumed to be endogenous in 
our model could instead be treated as exogenous. The bottom part of Table 6 displays 
chi square and F tests with their associated p-values confirming that our education 
variable is in fact endogenous when considering primary schooling, PISA scores in 
science, genetic and blood distance as instruments for schooling. The identification 
strategy also hinges on the hypothesis that variables which are used as instruments for 
education are uncorrelated with the error term. We also perform a number of tests to 
confirm that all instruments meet the exclusion criterion as they do not reject the 
initial hypothesis of validity.
5
  
                                                                                       
5
 When using two instruments the model is over-identified and, therefore, if at least one of the two 
instruments is valid, we can test for the validity of the other instrument. 
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Education is probably correlated with a number of factors which are 
commonly associated with economic freedom but not included in regression estimates 
of Table 6. In this case our estimates would suffer from endogeneity due to omission 
to include in our model a number of important covariates. To eliminate the risk of the 
omitted variable bias we consider a number of factors which could affect education 
through their influence on economic liberty. Accordingly, we include in our model the 
variables of GDP per capita (in logs), ethnic fractionalization and a number of 
geographical factors. Alesina et al. (2003) showed that different forms of 
fractionalization are important determinants of institutional quality and growth. In a 
similar spirit, we include latitude, longitude and continent dummies as they are 
associated with climatic factors and barriers for technology diffusion. All results 
reported in columns 1-4 of Table 7 confirm the positive influence of education on 
economic freedom after having controlled for the influence of the aforementioned 
variables.  
We also take into account the influence of trust which can be seen as an aspect 
of a culture within a society. Aghion et al. (2010) showed that trust is negatively 
associated with regulation and also for the demand for regulation. They also find that 
distrust leads to support for government regulation. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
argue that trust in societies is lower if education is also lower. Information for trust is 
provided form the World Values Survey (2015) and the relevant variable is created as 
the percentage of people that answer positively on the question if they trust other 
people from various groups (complete or partial trust). Results of column 5 confirm 
that the influence of education on economic freedom remains robust to the inclusion 
of this determinant. They also indicate that trust affects positively (at 10% level of 
statistical significance) the liberalization of countries. It bears noting that, as the 
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number of available observations for trust is low, the regression analysis is performed 
without considering all previously discussed covariates.  
Table 8 reports instrumental variable estimates when using two instruments 
for the variable of education. Primary school enrollment of countries is used as our 
main predictor for the variable of schooling and then all other instruments discussed 
previously are successively introduced in the regressions.
6
 We notice that the effect of 
education remains strong across all estimates reported in Table 8. We should notice 
that explanatory covariates included in Tables 7-8 could be endogenous. In this case, 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) reassure us that the coefficient of the variable of our interest, 
which is education, is biased downwards and therefore our hypothesis that education 
affects economic freedom is not affected.  
A final step to address endogeneity of education is to follow the GMM 
approach. We use the system GMM panel data estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Blundell and Bond 1998) which is the augmented version of the first differenced 
panel data estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). It has been designed for panel 
datasets with many panels and few periods as is the case for our model. This estimator 
eliminates country specific effects and employs as instruments the lagged levels and 
differences of endogenous covariates. As a rule of thumb for the choice of the number 
of lags, the selection is based on the criterion that all diagnostic tests should satisfy 
the condition of validity of the chosen instruments. Instead of the one step estimator, 
we use the two step estimator, since it is asymptotically more efficient and its standard 
covariance matrix is robust to panel specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
We also use its robust version to get the corrected covariance matrix. 
                                                                                       
6
 In countries for which no available information exists for 1930, we use primary school enrollment 
rates for 1935-1940. 
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In brief, the obtained GMM regression estimates of all columns in Table 9 
ascertain that the variable of education exerts a positive and significant influence on 
economic freedom though its effect is lower in magnitude compared to our 
instrumental variable estimates. We also notice that democracy acts in a positive way 
in the process of economic liberalization confirming that economic freedom goes 
hand in hand with political freedom. The system GMM panel data estimator reports 
several diagnostic tests. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the chosen 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals and therefore are acceptable 
instruments. The GMM estimator also reports a test for autocorrelation, which is 
applied to the first differenced residuals. If the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is 
rejected, then the test indicates that lags of the used instruments are in fact 
endogenous and thus are considered as weak instruments. The results of the Sargan 
test verify that the instruments are not correlated with the obtained residuals. In all 
regressions, the autocorrelation diagnostic test also confirms the null of no 
autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals.  
 
3.5 Non parametric analysis 
The majority of the econometric results provided so far show us that education 
influences economic freedom in a positive way. As the influence of schooling is 
probably non-linear, we proceed with non parametric regression to identify levels of 
schooling for which economic liberty is affected in a positive way. The most 
important feature of this approach is that no assumption for the functional form 
between economic freedom and education is needed but instead we let estimates be 
determined by the data. We rewrite Equation (1) as follows: 
                aEFWit  + )( itEDUC + t iti               (2) 
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where θ(·) is an unknown non linear function related to the influence of education on 
economic freedom. The model includes country and time specific effects (γi, βt) to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and omission biases related to technical change 
and macroeconomic shocks. We first estimate coefficients of the linear part of 
equation (2) by least squares which are used to redefine the dependent variable as y= 
EFW
*
 which is the part of economic freedom net of the influence of time and country 
fixed effects. In matrix notation the equation that we estimate is: 
         y= θ( )x +u                    (3) 
where y and x are the n×1 vectors of economic freedom and education, respectively. 
θ( )x  is approximated at a particular value 0x  by a pth order local polynomial smooth 
in (x-x0) for some x near x0 (Fan 1992). For each j= 0,…,p we estimate β0 = m(x0) by 
minimizing in βj the weighted least squares expression: 
)(})({ 0
2
0
01
xxKxxy ih
j
i
p
j
j
n
i
i 

 . The weights )(hK are defined as
)/()( 1 hxKhxKh
 , with )(hK being a Gaussian kernel function used to calculate the 
weighted local poloynomial estimate and h defining a bandwidth which specifies the 
half width of the kernel around each point.  
Figures 2.1-2.4 plot estimates of the impact of education (horizontal axis) on 
economic freedom (vertical axis) along with 95% confidence intervals across quartiles 
of education and illustrate that the influence on economic freedom rises as the level of 
education increases. For very low levels of schooling, Figure 2.1 ascertains that its 
influence is rather negative suggesting that economic policies in favor of government 
intervention are more likely to prevail when the educational level of the population 
shrinks. Figure 2.2 illustrates that economic freedom is not affected substantially 
across low to medium-low levels of education (average years of schooling between 
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4.5 and 7 years). By contrast, when moving to the medium-high quartile of the 
educational distribution (7 to 9.2 years of schooling) the influence of education rises 
and becomes statistically significant as the years of schooling increase (Figure 2.3). 
When it comes to very high levels of education (Figure 2.4) we confirm that its 
impact on economic freedom is positive and economically large. 
 
3.6 Impact of education subject to the degree of information 
So far we have seen that education exerts a decisive influence on the process of 
economic liberalization. We have argued that this kind of impact takes place through 
the channel of the information of citizens. Societies which consist of highly educated 
people are more likely to choose to liberalize their economic structures as citizens are 
aware that this kind of economic policy generates long term benefits despite the 
existence of short run adjustment costs. 
In this process, the quality and quantity of citizens' information plays a key 
role. Even when the provision of education remains at high standards, its beneficial 
effects will erode if public awareness is limited and the decision process is not based 
on precise information. We will test if this hypothesis holds and assess 
econometrically if the effect of schooling on economic freedom can be shaped by the 
extent of the available information. To our knowledge, the existing measures are 
rather inadequate to reflect the quantity and importantly the quality of people’s 
information. Nonetheless, indicators illustrating the diffusion of information and 
communications technology (ICT) are available and provide us with a measure to 
proxy for the amount of knowledge that is disseminated within a society. The 
advancement of ICT’s has already impacted on the public information process in a 
catalytic way as it enhances knowledge sharing by reducing temporal and spatial 
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barriers with a number of traditionally disadvantaged groups now having better access 
to information. 
For the purpose of our research, we use the number of internet users per 100 
people (World Bank Development Indicators) as a measure for the extent of 
information diffusion. Following the non-parametric methodology described in the 
previous section, we get estimates of the impact of education on economic freedom 
throughout various levels of internet use (Figures 3.1-3.4). When the diffusion of 
internet is low (lower than 1.48 users per 100 people), we notice that the influence of 
education is negative (Figure 3.1). Similarly, Figure 3.2 illustrates that this impact is 
lower than zero when the number of users ranges between 1.48 and 8.74 per 100 
people and the average years of schooling variable is lower than 8. However, for 
higher levels of education this influence switches to positive. When considering 
higher internet penetration rates (Figures 3.3 and 3.4) we obtain estimates which are 
in favor of a superior impact of schooling which rises as the number of total years of 
schooling increases.  
 Non parametric estimates of Figure 4 analyze the influence of schooling at 
various quartiles of media freedom (Freedom House 2017). This index could be used 
as a measure of citizens’ information since it assesses the degree of print, broadcast, 
and digital media freedom across countries. It provides numerical scores evaluating 
the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, 
economic factors that affect access to news and information and repressive actions 
such as killing of journalists, etc. It ranges from 0 to 100 with lower scores implying a 
higher score of media freedom. Again we verify that the degree of media freedom 
shapes the impact of education as its influence on economic liberty gets lower as 
freedom of the press diminishes (Figures 4.1-4.4).  
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As in the case of the educational variable, measures of information attainment 
that were used in the non parametric estimates of Figures 3 and 4 are probably 
endogenous. For this reason we employ as an instrument for the level of citizens’ 
information a global warming ignorance measure (Ray and Pugliese 2011) as the risk 
of being associated with economic freedom is low. The econometric estimates shown 
in Table 10 show the impact of education on economic freedom taking into account 
the degree of people’s information. To avoid endogeneity bias we use as instruments 
for the variables of education and information those of primary school enrollment 
rates in 1930 and global warming ignorance, respectively. We verify that the 
influence of education subject to the degree of people’s information is strongly 
positive while citizens’ ignorance acts as a deterrent to the process of economic 
liberalization. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We explored whether education plays a key role in the process of economic 
liberalization. Our basic argument is that economic freedom largely depends on the 
existence or not of a well educated and informed citizenry which ultimately decides 
through its voting decision whether economic policy should follow the liberal 
paradigm. 
Our findings suggest that the educational level is indeed a decisive factor of 
economic freedom. Information attainment and media freedom are the main channels 
through which education affects preferences towards less government intervention. 
We illustrated that this influence is non linear and raises as education increases. For 
low levels of schooling this impact is negative and implies that government 
intervention is more likely to prevail when the educational level of the population is 
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low. We showed that the size of the government, trade freedom and market regulation 
are the dimensions of economic freedom which are mostly affected. As the diffusion 
of information is an important factor in achieving economic freedom, we consider of 
crucial importance public policies that encourage pluralism in the mass media, 
promote the privatization of the media industry and open the market to foreign 
investors.  
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Figure 1: Economic freedom against average years of schooling 
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Table 1: Main descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Economic freedom 
(0-10) 
1,051 6.10 1.33 1.82 9.23 
Average years of 
schooling (years) 
1,000 6.90 2.96 0.45 13.18 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
1,175 8.72 1.23 5.99 12.35 
GDP per capita 
growth (%) 
1,156 0.03 0.05 -0.21 0.35 
Exports (% GDP) 1,175 0.23 0.25 0.001 2.17 
Imports (% GDP) 1,175 0.28 0.27 0.0004 2.46 
Age 65+ (% of 
population) 
1,229 7.12 4.68 0.82 23.90 
Public sector 
corruption (0-1) 
1,057 0.48 0.30 0.01 0.97 
Level of 
democracy (0-10) 
1,161 5.93 3.34 0.25 10.00 
Legal origin (UK) 1,233 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Legal origin 
(FRANCE) 
1,233 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Legal origin 
(Socialist) 
1,233 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Legal origin 
(German) 
1,233 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Government left 
(% of  seats) 
275 19.33 16.35 0.00 62.82 
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Table 2: Correlation of variables 
Variable 
Economic 
freedom 
(0-10) 
Average 
years of 
schooling 
(years) 
GDP per 
capita 
(log) 
GDP per 
capita 
growth (%) 
Exports 
(% GDP) 
Imports 
(% GDP) 
Age 65+ 
(% of 
population) 
Public sector 
corruption 
(0-1) 
Level of 
democracy  
(0-10) 
Legal 
origin 
(UK) 
Legal origin 
(FRANCE) 
Legal 
origin 
(Social) 
Legal 
origin 
(German) 
Economic freedom 
 (0-10) 
1.00             
Average years of 
schooling (years) 
0.68 1.00            
GDP per capita (log) 
0.61 0.84 1.00           
GDP per capita growth 
(%) 
0.29 0.18 0.12 1.00          
Exports (% GDP) 
0.38 0.49 0.54 0.12 1.00         
Imports (% GDP) 
0.47 0.48 0.48 0.09 0.79 1.00        
Age 65+ (% of 
population) 
0.55 0.75 0.80 0.08 0.47 0.48 1.00       
Public sector corruption 
(0-1) 
-0.41 -0.52 -0.60 0.00 -0.37 -0.34 -0.56 1.00      
Level of democracy  
(0-10) 
0.64 0.65 0.68 0.07 0.38 0.45 0.63 -0.55 1.00     
Legal origin (UK) 
0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.17 -0.10 0.09 1.00    
Legal origin (FRANCE) 
-0.23 -0.41 -0.22 -0.06 -0.15 -0.16 -0.30 0.27 -0.23 -0.62 1.00   
Legal origin (Social) 
0.05 0.31 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.11 -0.04 -0.25 -0.37 1.00  
Legal origin (German) 
0.22 0.22 0.26 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.27 -0.26 0.18 -0.14 -0.21 -0.08 1.00 
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Table 3: Baseline estimates  
Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant 
4.806*** 
(22.54)† 
4.240*** 
(18.84) 
5.811*** 
(14.04) 
4.609*** 
(5.38) 
3.494*** 
(4.00) 
3.102*** 
(3.51) 
3.754*** 
(6.43) 
-3.248* 
(-1.68) 
2.008*** 
(7.24) 
2.116*** 
(7.60) 
Economic freedom 
(lagged once) 
        
0.686*** 
(30.77) 
0.702*** 
(31.98) 
Average years of 
schooling 
0.058 
(1.43) 
0.069* 
(1.72) 
0.088** 
(2.08) 
0.083** 
(1.99) 
0.107*** 
(2.55) 
0.113*** 
(2.70) 
0.086*** 
(3.19) 
0.059 
(1.48) 
0.057*** 
(4.17) 
0.057*** 
(4.10) 
Level of democracy  
0.092*** 
(6.03) 
0.069*** 
(4.33) 
0.071*** 
(4.67) 
0.062*** 
(4.09) 
0.069*** 
(4.49) 
0.065*** 
(4.91) 
0. 293***  
(3.58) 
0.043*** 
(5.04) 
0.049*** 
(5.75) 
Public sector corruption   
-0.555** 
(-2.34) 
-0.520** 
(-2.23) 
-0.439* 
(-1.91) 
-0.417* 
(-1.79) 
-0.346** 
(-2.08) 
-0.404  
(-1.47) 
-0.187** 
(-2.24) 
-0.174** 
(-2.07) 
GDP per capita (in log)    
0.113 
(1.28) 
0.185** 
(2.12) 
0.201** 
(2.20) 
0.182*** 
(2.60) 
0.642*** 
(3.28) 
-0.077** 
(-2.07) 
-0.109*** 
(-2.96) 
GDP per capita growth    
4.502*** 
(8.10) 
4.680*** 
(8.56) 
4.619*** 
(8.36) 
4.979*** 
(8.66) 
7.380***  
(5.30) 
3.840*** 
(8.20) 
3.690*** 
(7.83) 
Exports (% of GDP)     
-1.505*** 
(-3.75) 
-1.534*** 
(-3.81) 
-1.353*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.202  
(-0.51) 
-0.614*** 
(-3.82) 
 
Imports (% of GDP)     
2.011*** 
(5.34) 
2.005*** 
(5.24) 
1.715*** 
(5.77) 
0.266  
(0.66) 
0.575*** 
(3.56) 
 
Age 65+ (% of 
population) 
     
0.015 
(0.66) 
0.005 
(0.36) 
0.018  
(1.01) 
0.007 
(1.03) 
0.009 
(1.41) 
Legal tradition (UK)       
-0.024 
(-0.10) 
0.545***  
(2.89) 
-0.046 
(-0.52) 
-0.0003 
(-0.00) 
Legal tradition (France)       
-0.109 
(-0.45) 
0.102  
(0.57) 
-0.077 
(-0.88) 
-0.030 
(-0.35) 
Legal tradition (Social.)       
-0.477* 
(-1.83) 
0.140  
(0.58) 
-0.164 
(-1.59) 
-0.103 
(-1.01) 
Legal tradition (German)       
0.285 
(0.94) 
0.439**  
(2.32) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.019 
(0.18) 
Government left        
-0.003*  
(-1.86) 
  
Time effects  included included included included included included included included included included 
Country effects  included included included included included included      
R2 0.581 0.604 0.624 0.656 0.670 0.673 0.672 0.791 0.769 0.766  
Observations 913 903 831 823 823 815 807 221 767 767 
                                            † The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions of columns 7-10 have  
been performed with the use of the random effect panel data estimator. 
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Table 4: Individual measures of economic freedom 
Dependent variable: Individual indicators of economic freedom 
 
Government 
size 
Legal system 
and property 
rights 
Sound 
money 
International 
trade 
freedom 
Regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Constant 
2.810*** 
(5.43)† 
0.550  
(1.29) 
2.739***  
(3.98) 
2.421*** 
 (4.49) 
1.876***  
(5.68) 
Once lagged dependent 
variable 
0.639***  
(29.59) 
0.626*** 
(23.58) 
0.640***  
(27.96) 
0.579*** 
 (23.58) 
0.769***  
(35.11) 
Average years of 
schooling 
0.079***  
(3.04) 
-0.002  
(-0.13) 
0.051  
(1.48) 
0.009*** 
 (3.63) 
0.040***  
(2.55) 
GDP per capita (in log) 
-0.171**  
(-2.50) 
0.187***  
(3.10) 
-0.106  
(-1.14) 
-0.147** 
 (-2.00) 
-0.093**  
(-2.16) 
GDP per capita growth 
2.259***  
(2.61) 
2.335***  
(3.14) 
8.362***  
(7.17) 
5.144*** 
(5.44) 
2.119***  
(3.94) 
Exports (% of GDP) 
-0.545*  
(-1.82) 
-0.373  
(-1.50) 
-1.241***  
(-3.05) 
 
 
-0.220  
(-1.20) 
Imports (% of GDP) 
0.141  
(0.48) 
0.405  
(1.61) 
1.615***  
(3.96) 
 
0.397**  
(2.15) 
Age 65+ (% of 
population) 
-0.040***  
(-3.08) 
0.021*  
(1.92) 
0.035**  
(2.00) 
0.031** 
 (2.31) 
0.010  
(1.26) 
Public sector corruption 
0.234  
(1.50) 
-0.470***  
(-3.45) 
-0.332  
(-1.60) 
-0.084 
 (-0.50) 
-0.229**  
(-2.40) 
Level of democracy 
0.041***  
(2.64) 
0.026*  
(1.98) 
0.033  
(1.57) 
 0.091*** 
(5.30) 
0.019*  
(1.95) 
Legal tradition (UK) 
0.408**  
(2.41) 
-0.410***  
(-2.97) 
-0.097  
(-0.42) 
-0.050 
 (-0.29) 
0.065  
(0.64) 
Legal tradition (France) 
0.365**  
(2.19) 
-0.673***  
(-4.86) 
0.095  
(0.42) 
0.076 
 (0.44) 
-0.054  
(-0.54) 
Legal tradition (Social.) 0.283 (1.46) 
-0.616***  
(-3.88) 
-0.196  
(-0.75) 
-0.304 
 (-1.51) 
-0.003  
(-0.03) 
Legal tradition (German) 
0.463**  
(2.25) 
-0.281*  
(-1.71) 
0.125  
(0.45) 
-0.117 
(-0.55) 
-0.042  
(-0.35) 
Time effects  included included included included included 
R2 0.532  0.362 0.548 0.627 0.641 
Observations 790 730 802 759 760 
         † The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and  
         10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Other measures of schooling 
Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
3.578***  
(6.26)† 
1.709***  
(6.29) 
3.495***  
(6.15) 
1.698  
(6.41) 
Economic freedom 
(lagged once) 
 
0.687***  
(30.39) 
 
0.685***  
(30.29) 
Average years of 
secondary schooling 
0.125***  
(2.82) 
0.046*  
(1.92) 
  
Average years of tertiary 
schooling 
  
0.425**  
(2.50) 
0.192**  
(2.27) 
GDP per capita (in log) 
0.235***  
(3.72) 
-0.012  
(-0.37) 
0.268***  
(4.49) 
-0.003  
(-0.12) 
GDP per capita growth 
5.055***  
(8.76) 
3.861***  
(8.17) 
5.061***  
(8.76) 
3.904***  
(8.26) 
Exports (% of GDP) 
-1.412***  
(-4.57) 
-0.609*** 
 (-3.75) 
-1.475***  
(-4.71) 
-0.630***  
(-3.87) 
Imports (% of GDP) 
1.743***  
(5.86) 
0.595***  
(3.65) 
1.803***  
(6.01) 
0.642***  
(3.90) 
Age 65+ (% of 
population) 
0.003  
(0.026) 
0.004  
(0.70) 
0.001  
(0.08) 
0.004  
(0.62) 
Public sector corruption 
-0.357**  
(-2.15) 
-0.232***  
(-2.78) 
-0.335**  
(-2.01) 
-0.230***  
(-2.76) 
Level of democracy 
0.070***  
(5.38) 
0.048***  
(5.57) 
0.073***  
(5.53) 
0.047***  
(5.54) 
Legal tradition (UK) 
0.004  
(0.02) 
-0.007  
(-0.009) 
-0.038  
(-0.15) 
-0.013  
(-0.15) 
Legal tradition (France) 
-0.126  
(-0.52) 
-0.075  
(-0.85) 
-0.197  
(-0.80) 
-0.090  
(-1.02) 
Legal tradition (Social.) 
-0.422*  
(-1.65) 
-0.060  
(-0.60) 
-0.374  
(-1.46) 
-0.051  
(-0.52) 
Legal tradition (German) 
0.253  
(0.83) 
0.012  
(0.12) 
0.311  
(1.03) 
0.034  
(0.32) 
Time effects  included included included included 
R2 0.670 0.766 0.670 0.765 
Observations 807 767 807 767 
† The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at  
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6: Instrumental variable estimates (initial estimates)  
 First stage regression, Dependent variable: Average  years of schooling 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
-0.738  
(-0.44) † 
5.954***  
(12.60) 
6.118*** 
(11.00) 
5.175** 
(9.51) 
Primary Enrollment 
Ratio in 1930 
0.029*** 
(3.35) 
0.069*** 
(10.05) 
0.069*** 
(9.69) 
0.077*** 
(12.53) 
Pizza score 
0.018***  
(4.36) 
   
Weighted genet distance 
to Canada 
 
-0.007***  
(-2.69) 
  
Weighted genet distance 
to the USA 
  
-0.0008** 
(-2.35) 
 
Blood distance from the 
USA 
   
-0.090 
(-0.32) 
F test 
53.95 
(0.00) 
96.26  
(0.00) 
90.83 
(0.00) 
93.77 
(0.00) 
Adj. R2 0.632 0.6387 0.623 0.625 
Observations 55 100 100 97 
 Second stage regression, Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
Constant 
3.809***  
(8.36) †† 
4.393***  
(17.44) 
4.373***  
(17.05) 
4.315*** 
(17.49) 
Average years of 
schooling 
0.356***  
(7.63) 
0.294***  
(10.24) 
0.296***  
(10.11) 
0.304***  
(10.81) 
Wald test 
58.20  
(0.00) 
104.82  
(0.00) 
102.31  
(0.00) 
116.91  
(0.00) 
R2 0.240 0.442 0.436 0.450 
Observations 55 100 100 97 
Endogeneity test (chi2)1 
13.907  
(0.00) 
7.126  
(0.00) 
7.329 
(0.00) 
11.978  
(0.00) 
Endogeneity test (F)1 
18.999  
(0.00) 
7.797  
(0.00) 
8.097 
(0.01) 
15.041  
(0.00) 
Instrument validity test 
(chi2)2 
0.162 
(0.68) 
0.066 
(0.79) 
0.065  
(0.79) 
0.579 
(0.44) 
                     † t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                                              †† z-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                               ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
                              1 Ho: variables are exogenous. 
              2 Ho: instruments are valid. 
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Table 7: Instrumental variable estimates (additional explanatory variables)  
First stage regression, Dependent variable: Average  years of schooling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 
1.286*** 
(6.67)† 
-5.109***  
(-2.81) 
-4.676**  
(-2.44) 
-4.137**  
(-2.14) 
6.128*** 
(11.25) 
Primary Enrollment 
Ratio in 1930 
0.038***  
(4.75) 
0.038***  
(4.75) 
0.041***  
(5.40) 
0.037***  
(5.09) 
0.064*** 
(7.01) 
F test 
207.38  
(0.00) 
137.63  
(0.00) 
81.15  
(0.00) 
53.55 
(0.00) 
27.90 
(0.00) 
Adj. R2 0.776 0.774 0.780 0.791 0.525 
Observations 102 102 102 102 39 
Second stage regression, Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
Constant 
3.915***  
(3.16)†† 
4.239***  
(3.28) 
3.917***  
(2.99) 
3.989***  
(3.02) 
4.683***  
(11.81) 
Average years of 
schooling 
0.271***  
(2.58) 
0.265***  
(2.52) 
0.260***  
(2.60) 
0.280**  
(2.41) 
0.215***  
(4.47) 
GDP per capita (in log) 
0.070  
(0.32) 
0.051  
(0.23) 
0.119  
(0.53) 
0.098  
(0.44) 
 
Ethnic fractionalization  
-0.237  
(-0.83) 
-0.407  
(-1.31) 
-0.432  
(-1.27) 
 
Longitude   
-0.0002  
(-0.16) 
-0.0008  
(-0.26) 
 
Latitude   
-0.006  
(-1.33) 
-0.003  
(-0.54) 
 
Continent Europe    
-0.241  
(-0.58) 
 
Continent America    
-0.068  
(-0.20) 
 
Continent Asia-Oceania    
-0.036  
(-0.11) 
 
Trust     
0.013*  
(1.79) 
Wald test 
157.76  
(0.00) 
159.72  
(0.00) 
161.79  
(0.00) 
164.17  
(0.00) 
36.48  
(0.00) 
R2 0.491 0.498 0.510 0.499 0.439 
Observations 102 102 102 102 39 
                      † t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                               †† z-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                     ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Instrumental variable estimates (two instruments)  
First stage regression, Dependent variable: Average  years of schooling 
Constant 
0.699 
(0.19)† 
-5.882*** 
(-2.86) 
-5.905*** 
(-2.85) 
-3.459 
(-1.62) 
Primary Enrollment 
Ratio in 1930 
0.034*** 
 (3.39) 
0.038*** 
(5.01) 
0.036*** 
(4.99) 
0.036*** 
(4.95) 
Pizza score 
0.007 
(1.37) 
   
Weighted genet distance 
to Canada 
 
0.0007*** 
(2.53) 
  
Weighted genet distance 
to the USA 
  
0.0009*** 
(2.59) 
 
Blood distance from the 
USA 
   
-0.014 
(-0.06) 
F test 
96.66 
 (0.00) 
46.87 
(0.00) 
46.63 
(0.00) 
45.07 
(0.00) 
Adj. R2 0.642 0.792 0.790 0.797 
Observations 55 100 100 97 
Second stage regression, Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
Constant 
0.112 
 (0.07)†† 
4.017*** 
(3.03) 
3.963*** 
(2.99) 
4.806*** 
(3.60) 
Average years of 
schooling 
0.193** 
 (1.96) 
0.254** 
(2.21) 
0.261** 
(2.16) 
0.351*** 
(2.93) 
GDP per capita (in log) 
0.557*** 
 (2.64) 
0.117 
(0.54) 
0.114 
(0.52) 
-0.053 
(-0.24) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-0.220 
 (-0.71) 
-0.447 
(-1.28) 
-0.402 
(-1.19) 
-0.339 
(-0.96) 
Longitude 
-0.002 
 (-0.89) 
-0.007 
(-0.23) 
-0.0005 
(-0.18) 
-0.004 
(-1.18) 
Latitude 
-0.17**  
(-1.96) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
-0.004 
(-0.58) 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
Continent Europe 
 0.468 
(0.86) 
-0.152 
(-0.36) 
-0.186 
(-0.42) 
-0.299 
(-0.65) 
Continent America 
0.282 
 (0.45) 
-0.057 
(-0.16) 
-0.047 
(-0.13) 
-0.089 
(-0.25) 
Continent Asia-Oceania 
 0.819 
(1.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.030 
(-0.09) 
0.094 
(0.25) 
Wald test 
96.50 
 (0.00) 
159.05 
(0.00) 
153.44 
(0.00) 
151.30 
(0.00) 
R2 0.567 0.487 0.478 0.427 
Observations 55 100 100 97 
                          † t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                                     †† z-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                         ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: GMM estimates 
Dependent variable: Economic freedom     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
1.251 
 (0.46) † 
1.606 
 (0.44) 
 0.648 
(0.18) 
-1.306 
 (-0.29) 
 1.617 
(0.51) 
0.690 
 (0.20) 
Economic freedom (lagged once) 
0.352 
(0.86) 
0.386 
(1.09) 
0.349 
(0.80) 
0.216 
(0.55) 
0.244 
(0.63) 
0.329 
(0.79) 
Average years of schooling 
(instrument) 
0.156*** 
(3.18) 
0.132* 
(1.80) 
0.148* 
(1.66) 
0.071 
(0.50) 
0.136*** 
(2.49) 
0.153*** 
(2.91) 
GDP per capita (in log, lagged 
once) 
0.057 
(0.11) 
0.042 
(0.08) 
0.097 
(0.15) 
0.491 
(0.63) 
0.042 
(0.08) 
0.106 
(0.18) 
GDP per capita growth (lagged 
once) 
-0.573 
(-0.23) 
0.327 
(0.10) 
-0.657 
(-0.21) 
-2.003 
(-0.61) 
-0.422 
(-0.16) 
-0.635 
(-0.24) 
Age 65+ (% of population, lagged 
once) 
0.015 
(0.55) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.017 
(0.42) 
-0.039 
(-0.38) 
0.014 
(0.49) 
0.011 
(0.38) 
Public sector corruption (lagged 
once) 
0.591 
(0.98) 
-0.083 
(-0.06) 
0.684 
(0.67) 
0.419 
(0.42) 
0.511 
(0.80) 
0.612 
(0.94) 
Level of democracy (lagged 
once) 
0.135* 
(1.62) 
0.126* 
(1.73) 
0.133* 
(1.66) 
0.148** 
(2.03) 
0.149* 
(1.83) 
0.143* 
(1.87) 
Legal tradition (UK)  
-0.466 
(-0.70) 
    
Legal tradition (France)   
0.009 
(0.02) 
   
Legal tradition (Social.)    
0.599 
(0.59) 
  
Legal tradition (German)     
0.572 
(0.90) 
 
Legal tradition (Scand.)      
-0.534 
(-0.45) 
Time effects  included included included included included included 
Country effects  included included included included included included 
Wald 798.37 1.106.49 880.77 674.02 734.09 733.40 
Observations 762 754 754 754 754 754 
Sargan test (p-value) †† 
11.31 
 (0.41) 
10.79 
(0.37) 
11.20 
(0.34) 
11.02 
(0.35) 
11.48 
(0.32) 
11.28 
(0.33) 
AR (2) test (p-value) ††† 
-1.02  
(0.30) 
-0.99 
(0.32) 
-1.08 
(0.28) 
-1.10 
(0.27) 
-1.15 
(0.25) 
-1.08 
(0.28) 
 † The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
†† The null hypothesis that the instruments used in the regression are valid.  
††† The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-differenced regression do not exhibit second order serial correlation. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Figure 2: Impact of education on economic freedom across quartiles of schooling 
Fig. 2.1: lowest quartile  
 
Fig. 2.2: low to medium quartile  
 
Fig. 2.3: medium to high quartile  
 
Fig. 2.4:highst quartile  
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Figure 3: Impact of education on economic freedom across quartiles of internet use 
Fig. 3.1: lowest quartile  
 
Fig. 3.2: low to medium quartile  
 
Fig. 3.3: medium to high quartile  
 
Fig. 3.4:highst quartile  
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Figure 4: Impact of education on economic freedom across quartiles of media 
freedom 
(Rating from 0 to 100 with low scores implying higher press freedom) 
Fig. 4.1: lowest quartile  
 
Fig. 4.2: low to medium quartile  
 
Fig. 4.3: medium to high quartile  
 
Fig. 4.4:highst quartile  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Regression estimates based on instruments for  
schooling and information 
Dependent variable: Economic freedom 
Constant 
5.808*** 
 (48.43)† 
7.503*** 
(56.10) 
6.624*** 
(18.13) 
 
Primary Enrollment 
Ratio in 1930 
0.023*** 
(11.51) 
 
0.014*** 
(3.13) 
 
Climate change 
ignorance 
 
-2.680*** 
(-7.94) 
-1.393** 
(-2.27) 
 
F test 
132.41 
(0.00) 
 63.12 
(0.00) 
70.00 
(0.00) 
 
R2 0.448 0.346 0.460  
Observations 106 89 81  
                          † t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
                         ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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